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Constitutional Development of Estonia in 1988
Igor Gryazin *
I have had many a chance to familiarize myself with different assess-
ments and interpretations of the constitutional developments in Estonia,
one of the Soviet Union's fifteen republics, both in Moscow and in the
Western press. These assessments and interpretations vary between two
extremes: (a) constitutional reforms in Estonia are just a face-lift repair
of the juridical facade of the Soviet political system that does not influ-
ence the essence of the system; and (b) these reforms are manifestations
of radical nationalism and separatism; in substance, the Estonian Soviet
Socialist Republic (ESSR) attempted to secede from the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1988.
In the context of shortage of information and of the differences in
political backgrounds and subjective aims of those who interpret the con-
stitutional events in Estonia, these differences can well be understood.
Thus, in the present Paper, I attempt to fill the information vacuum, as
well as to demonstrate that neither of the above extreme characteriza-
tions are justified. I hereby formulate this conclusion: at the first stage,
the constitutional reform in the Estonian SSR was aimed at dismantling
federal dictatorship in the Republic and at preserving Estonia's member-
ship in the Union on the basis of democratic federalism. The present
Paper consists of nine parts: (1) the constitutional history of Estonia; (2)
precursors of the constitutional reform; (3) the text of the draft amend-
ments to the Constitution of the Estonian SSR; (4) commentary on the
"Addenda"; (5) the speedy evolution of events; (6) the November 16,
1988 session; (7) procedure for registering federal laws in the Republic;
(8) the federation's reaction; and (9) constitutional conflict.
Two remarks must be made before we proceed to the Paper itself.
First, constitutional reform, as any other important political process,
does not occur at once. The year 1988 was only the beginning of consti-
tutional reform in Estonia. Thus, my Paper is not a motion picture about
the constitutional reform, with the word "end" coming in conclusion, but
rather a photo of the situation that has taken shape by March 1, 1989.
Despite that at present no one can predict the end of this story, I hope
that this "photo" will be of interest to my American colleagues who are
so keen on everything that concerns constitutionalism. It is not that the
development of Estonia's constitution (with a mere 1.5 million residing
in the Republic!) has any global significance, but rather that the process
of constitution-making itself is juridically interesting. This process
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raises, as a rule, a number of general theoretical questions that are usu-
ally ignored, or overlooked, at "quiet" or ordinary times. Perhaps, my
esteemed American colleagues will read these lines with a certain nostal-
gic feeling, reminiscent of their nation's halcyon days when it had to
solve many similar problems.
In contrast to a confederation, which, for reasons of its relative insta-
bility, must heed the interests of its members seeking consensus, a feder-
ation, by virtue of its legal nature, is the unity of two relatively
equipowerful, acute dialectical opposites: the federal power's tendency
toward maximal centralization and the federation members' tendencies
to maximally preserve their independence. This dualism, apparently, is
inescapable.1 This phenomenon, at the level of state law, is common to
both the United States and the Soviet Union. If we engage in looking for
analogies to 1988 Estonia in the history of the United States, then the
present situation .in the Republic can be likened to 1798-1799, the years
of friction between Federalists and Republicans regarding the Alien and
Sedition Acts2 and the so-called Kentucky Resolutions.3 The ideas of
these resolutions are largely consonant with the intellectual groundwork
of Estonia's constitutional reform.
Second, many emotions and passions have arisen around the consti-
tution and its reform in Estonia, both in Moscow and in the Republic
itself. Naturally, political, rather than academic juridical considerations
are behind many moves. Constitutions cannot exist isolated from politi-
cians, at least at the formation stage. I will ignore this aspect of the prob-
lem, however, although it is quite interesting. Nor will I dwell on the
issues of Estonia's social development in the past few years, which played
thi decisive role in the development of the constitutional reforms in
1988. I will also refrain from discussing the events that unfolded during
the adoption of the documents; evidently, these events have not re-
mained undescribed. Instead, I will just try to present, without indulging
in emotions and making assessments, a doctrinal analysis of some docu-
ments of milestone significance for Estonia's recent constitutional
development.
1 2 L. DUGUIT, TRAITI- DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 144 (3d ed. 1927). It was no coincidence
that Duguit in his time noted that no juridically correct concept of sovereignty was feasible in a
federal state.
2 The Alien and Sedition Acts collectively refer to four individual acts passed during the sum-
mer of 1798: the Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798); the Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570
(1798); the Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); and the Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596
(1798). The first three acts-the Alien Acts-made it more difficult for aliens to remain in the
United States by increasing the residency requirement for naturalization and by authorizing the
President to deport those aliens whom he deemed dangerous to national security. The Sedition Act
made it a crime to impede the operation of government or to libel the government in speech or
writing. For a discussion of the political and legal controversies surrounding the passage of these
acts, seeJ. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS (1956).
3 The Kentucky Resolutions, drafted by Thomas Jefferson, attacked the constitutionality of the
Alien and Sedition Acts. See generally D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 395-409
(1962); Koch & Harry, The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in Jefferson's and Madison's De-
fense of Civil Liberties, 5 WM. & MARY Q. (3d. ser.) 145 (1948). The United States Supreme Court,
however, did not formally declare the Sedition Act unconstitutional until New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
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As far as I know, the English text of the Constitution of the USSR
adopted in 1977 is easily accessible to experts in the United States, so I
will refrain from quoting from it.4 The Constitution of the Estonian SSR,
adopted in 1978, which is obviously less accessible in the United States,
was, in effect, a copy of the federal Constitution and did not incorporate
anything original until November, 1988. That is why, when speaking of
the Estonian Constitution, I will also refer to the corresponding articles
of the federal Constitution.
Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude
to my American friends: Professor John B. Attanasio (Professor of Law,
University of Notre Dame, Indiana) and David Good (then acting Secre-
tary of State of Montana) for their invaluable recommendations, without
which some of the documents listed below could not have been drafted.
It is not our fault that our common advice, particularly about the undesir-
ability of adopting the "supremacy clause," was never realized. Obvi-
ously, the theoretically optimal way of constitutional reform and its real
implementation through the parliament, which is influenced by factors
other than purely legal arguments, never coincide completely.
Comforting myself in this way, I shall get down to business.
I. The Constitutional History of Estonia
Let me begin with a brief outline of Estonia's state and legal history
in the twentieth century. Before the 1918 revolution in Russia, the mod-
em territory of Estonia, populated mostly by Estonians, was part of the
Russian Empire, which annexed this territory after the defeat of Sweden
in 1721. The territory was divided between two administrative-territorial
units-provinces or gubernias in Russian. During the Civil War in Russia
and the Estonian liberation war, Estonia acquired self-government and
independence within its modem confines. The first constitution of Esto-
nia was adopted in 1920 when Estonia became a parliamentary republic,
and in 1921 Estonia joined the League of Nations. Later, in 1934 and
1938, two constitutional reforms were carried out there, and as a result,
Estonia became a presidential republic.
In 1940, Estonia was admitted to the USSR as a result of the 1938
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which divided the spheres of influence be-
tween the USSR and Germany.5 The sovereign existence of Estonia was
ended, and the Republic was renamed the Estonian Soviet Socialist Re-
public. The power of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR was extended
4 The changes introduced into the Constitution in November-December 1988 have been pub-
lished in the United States (see infra note 19), but these changes are of no principal importance for
our topic.
5 Germany alone recognized the act of Estonia's joining the Soviet Union. [Since the original
drafting of this paper, the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies has condemned the Molotov-Rib-
bentrop Pact. See Fein, Soviet Congress Condemns '39 Pact That Led to Annexation of Baltics, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 25, 1989, at Al, col. 2. Ed.]
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over Estonia. 6 Nevertheless, the question of the legal basis of Estonia's
joining the Soviet Union remains unresolved.
7
The acting Constitution of the Estonian SSR came into force in
1978. It copies the less fortunate (in the legal sense) Constitution of the
USSR adopted in 1977, as has already been mentioned.
II. Prerequisities of the Constitutional Reform
The main constitutional reforms of 1988 were intellectually inspired
by the decisions of the nineteenth All-Union Conference of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union, the June and September Plenary Meetings
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, and the
program theses of the new, massive political movement-the Popular
Front of Estonia. It was necessary to fix the achieved level of democrati-
zation of society and to provide guarantees that could rule out any possi-
bility of a return to the totalitarian past.
The first impetus to the reforms in Estonia was the idea of Estonia's
transition to complete cost-accounting and economic self-government
put forward in September 1987 by four economists and politicians: Kal-
las, Made, Savisaar and Titma. The economic essence of the "proposal
of the four" was that the Estonian SSR, remaining within the Soviet
Union, had to enter equal commodity-economic, rather than administra-
tive-subordinate, relationships with the federation, if the former was to
achieve the effectiveness of its economy. Estonia had to spend what it
had earned and to do it in the way that was most profitable for it. On the
other hand, Estonia had to have the right to everything it had earned
except that part of the earnings that would go to the federal funds ac-
cording to pre-set quotas.
The evolution of this idea brought forth the realization that imple-
menting economic self-government presupposes the Republic's political
competence and its protection from any interference by the federal au-
thorities in its internal affairs, i.e. the restoration of the state sovereignty
which has so far existed only formally."
All the Republic's newspapers started to carry hundreds of state-
ments on the matters relating to the constitutional development of the
Republic under the conditions of restructuring in the economy.
Thousands of people took part in the discussion. This massive move-
ment had a negative aspect, too. A great number of ideas and proposals,
which not only complemented, but also opposed each other, often over-
shadowed the understanding of the general idea. The line of difference
between the main and the secondary ideas was obscured, and the discus-
6 A paradoxical fact: contrary to the massive Stalinist crimes, the Constitution of the USSR
adopted in 1936, which was formally in effect at that time, was quite democratic. It contained many
civic freedoms, including freedom of the press and freedom of social organization. It also did not
include a provision giving supremacy to one political party. This was added in the 1977 Constitution
and still remains. See KONST. SSSR art. 6.
7 The events of 1940 in Estonia were described by many historians, and I don't feel in the
position to analyze them historically. The legal aspects of the matter are only starting to be analyzed
in earnest.
8 See KONST. SSSR art. 76; KONST. ESSR art. 68.
[Vol. 65:141
ESTONIAN CONSTITUTION
sion itself turned into an anarchy of opinions. A document, a text, that
could concentrate the people's intellectual potential at key aspects of the
fundamental law was necessary.
In a sense, the text of amendments to the Constitution of the Esto-
nian SSR, later called "the Gryazin project," provided the point of depar-
ture for the constitutional reform in Estonia. It was published on
September 28, 1988, as a draft for further discussion. As its author, I
would like to dwell on several aspects of this project.
First, this project is not the fruit of the efforts of a single person or
any official group. It formulates and systematizes some of the ideas that
were in the air in September of 1988. That is why in the further narra-
tion I will subsequently refer to it as "Addenda."
Second, the publication of this document was not an official act, but
an initiative of a group of scientists.
Third, the document was intended for at least a six-month
discussion.
Fourth, adoption of the articles in question was regarded as a tem-
porary measure to be in effect before the adoption of the new Constitu-
tion of the Estonian SSR. We meant to win time for this work.
Fifth, the publication of this document in the present Paper is con-
nected to the fact that, for a number of objective reasons, and despite its
drawbacks, this document became the basis and the program of the con-
stitutional changes, which were subsequently implemented.9
III. The Text of the Draft Amendments to the Constitution of ESSR
Article 1
The following amendments have a temporary character in the sense
that the working out of the draft of the new constitution starts immedi-
ately after these amendments are adopted. These amendments are of a
constant character in the sense that they present an inseparable and equi-
potent part of the acting Constitution of the Estonian SSR.
Article 2
The Constitution of the ESSR, together with these amendments, is
the Fundamental Law of the Republic, which means that in case of neces-
sity, observance is obligatory by all law-enforcing bodies-courts of law,
courts of arbitration, procurator's offices, organs of state security and
public order, as well as by all officials.
Any subordinate legal act by either Union or republican bodies,
whether the act be in law, decrees, instructions, etc., shall be rejected and
refused application if it is not in conformity with the Constitution of the
ESSR.
Any ruling by the People's Court or departmental arbitration that
refuses application of a legal act shall become valid and binding on all
9 The text of the document presented here does not completely coincide with the text pub-
lished in the newspapers. It has been edited and amended, e.g., the sequence of articles, terminol-
ogy. I hereby present the final version, compiled on October 2.
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courts and organs of state arbitration after it is affirmed by the Supreme
Court or the State Arbitration of the Republic.
Article 3
All all-union legal acts become effective in the territory of the Re-
public after they are registered by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the Estonian SSR. Conformity with the Constitution of the Estonian
SSR shall be the sole criterion for the registration of any legal act.
All all-union laws and other legal acts that were in effect before the
adoption of the "Addenda" shall be considered as registered by the Esto-
nian SSR. If during their application they prove contradictory to the
Constitution of the Estonian SSR, they shall be refused application on
the basis of the second paragraph of Article 2 of the "Addenda," about
which the all-union body that passed the act in question shall be
informed.
Article 4
Pacts and declarations defending the rights of man and citizen,
which are internationally recognized and ratified by the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics shall be an inseparable part of the law and order of
the Estonian SSR.
Article 5
The sovereignty of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic implies
that the republic-represented by its bodies of state power, state admin-
istration and organs ofjustice-shall have the supreme power on the ter-
ritory of the Republic. The sovereignty of the Republic is integral and
indivisible; however, in the interests of the unity of the USSR-with the
purpose of its preservation and development-the Estonian SSR shall re-
nounce the execution of some of its sovereign rights. The limits of the
competence of the Union of SSR and the Estonian SSR are specified by
Articles 73 of the Constitutions of the USSR and the ESSR.
Article 6
The Popular Front and other mass public movements shall be an
inseparable part of the political system of the Republic together with the
public organizations enumerated in Chapter 1 of the Constitution of the
ESSR.
Article 7
The territory of the Estonian SSR shall comprise the land, mineral
resources, airspace, territorial waters and continental shelf recognized by
international law. The sovereignty of the Estonian SSR and the state
ownership of land shall imply the right of the organs of state power and
administration to levy taxes for the use of lands independently from the
juridical status of the land-user. The Estonian SSR shall have the right to
[Vol. 65:141
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terminate the use of land if it does not correspond to the interests of the
Republic.
Article 8
The sovereignty of the Estonian SSR shall comprise the right inde-
pendently to issue securities. The rate of exchange of these securities to
the securities of the Union of SSR and other states shall be determined
by corresponding special agreements.
Article 9
State enterprises, situated on the territory of the ESSR, shall be the
property of the Republic. The Estonian SSR, on clearly expressing its
will, shall transfer some enterprises to the all-union or union-republic
subordination. Union departments shall have the right to invest their
capital in the Estonian SSR and derive profits from them with the con-
sent of, and on the terms suggested by, the government of the Estonian
SSR. Movable property of military units stationed on the territory of the
Estonian SSR shall be the property of the Union of SSR.
Article 10
The product, turned out at the enterprises of the Estonian SSR and
at the enterprises of the union subordination, shall be the property of the
ESSR, outside the limits specified in Article 9.
Article 11
The Estonian SSR shall participate in the formation of the union
budget, on the basis of parity, in common with the other union republics.
The Estonian SSR shall make payments to the union budget within the
limits of open budget contributions and in the form of fixed payments.
The participation of the Estonian SSR in all-union programs as well
as the exchange of goods with the other union republics shall be per-
formed on the basis of corresponding agreements.
The Republic shall be independent in utilization of revenues derived
from its foreign economic activities. Part of such revenues shall go to the
all-union currency fund on the basis of corresponding agreements.
The Estonian SSR shall have an independent responsibility for the
foreign economic commitments of the Republic.
Article 12
The Estonian SSR recognizes the legitimate property of the citizens
and juridical persons and provides for protection and inviolability of
such property in a court of law. The all-union and foreign investments in
the Republic and the profits derived from such investments shall not be
subject to nationalization.
Except as confiscation in the form of punishment for a criminal of-
fense, the compulsory alienation of property shall be conducted for com-
1990]
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pensation only, the amount of compensations shall be determined either
with the consent of the interested parties or by a court of law.
Article 13
In the Estonian SSR, a citizen is subject to criminal proceedings ex-
clusively for actions, but not for beliefs, political opinions or their
expression.
Article 14
The Estonian SSR shall provide legal protection of all basic civic
freedoms, specified by Articles 45, 48, 49, 50 of the Constitution of the
ESSR. This implies that any limitations on such rights or freedoms can
be brought about exclusively by a court ruling.
Only an open law shall be binding on all citizens.
Article 15
Besides the rights spelled out in the Constitution of the ESSR, citi-
zens of the Estonian SSR shall have the rights:
(a) to a healthy environment;
(b) to free abrogation of the citizenship of the Estonian SSR;
(c) to state insurance against unemployment;
(d) to appeal before a court for protection of their constitutional
rights and freedoms.
Article 16
The list of basic civic rights and freedoms given in the text of the
Constitution of the ESSR and the "Addenda" is not complete. The Esto-
nian SSR shall provide state and legal protection of the universally recog-
nized human rights not listed herein.
Article 17
The freedom of conscience existing in the Estonian SSR implies the
freedom of atheistic and religious activities and expression. All religious
denominations shall be equal before the state and are separated from it.
Article 18
The Estonian language shall be the state language of the Estonian
SSR. The Estonian language shall be used in business correspondence
of the bodies of state power and administration, institutions, enterprises
and organizations. The use of the state language of the Estonian SSR
and other languages is regulated by law.
Article 19
The Estonian SSR shall provide for equality of all ethnic minorities





The Estonian SSR shall have its own citizenship. Issues relating to
the citizenship of the Estonian SSR shall be regulated by law.
Article 21
The new Constitution of the Estonian SSR shall be adopted after the
national voting referendum. Only the citizens of the Estonian SSR shall
participate in the referendum.
The new Constitution of the ESSR shall be adopted if two-thirds of
the citizens of the Estonian SSR, who have the right to vote, approve of
it.
IV. Commentary on the Addenda
This text requires comment. I will note that the very idea of initiat-
ing the constitutional reform in the form of amendments to the main text
of the constitution was borrowed from the United States. I chose this
way for a number of reasons:
(a) the absence of problems connected with the need to preserve the
system and pattern of present text of the Constitution of the ESSR. Be-
sides, the correction of the main text of the Constitution of the ESSR,
which I attempted in 1987-1988, demonstrated that it was more expedi-
ent to compile a new addenda than to correct the main text satisfactorily;
(b) the technically simple way of complementing amendments with
new articles; and.
(c) the clear line of difference between the old and the new text
("Addenda") of the Constitution of the ESSR, which enables a layperson
to see the very essence of new constitutional provisions. In addition,
complete preservation of the old text ruled out questions about preserv-
ing particular parts of it.1O
Now let us switch over to the commentary on the articles given
above.
Article 1. This article legally fixes the status of the Addenda, their
equality to the main text of the Constitution of the ESSR, and the long-
term objective-the creation of the new constitution. It is specified that
the articles of the then existing Constitution of the ESSR must be prop-
erly applied in the new context provided by the Addenda.
Article 2. This article for the first time characterizes the subtitle of
the Constitution of the ESSR as the fundamental law. Thus far, the pub-
lic and professional lawyers have perceived the Constitution of the ESSR
as a declarative political text and have not applied it in practice. How-
ever, the constitutional reform has meaning only if this article is there. If
no one applies the constitution, then its content has no importance
whatsoever.
10 The example of changes introduced in the Constitution of the USSR in November-December,
1988 is quite demonstrative. By introducing changes in the old text, it was indirectly confirmed that
the intact parts of the text were favored by the Supreme Soviet, despite that some of them were
clearly unsatisfactory. This necessitated the reservation that the old articles were "conditionally" in
effect which, in the purely legal sense, weakened the legal force of the Fundamental Law.
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Taking decisions on concrete cases, the bodies responsible for ap-
plying the law have so far abstained from referring to the Constitution of
the ESSR and refused to consider cases based on direct constitutional
references. This article is binding on the bodies responsible for applying
the law and requires that they refuse to apply subordinate acts (laws, de-
crees, instructions, etc.) when such acts contradict the Fundamental
Law-thus stressing the special legal status of the constitution. Thus, the
judicial branch acquires a power of its own as a branch isolated from the
legislative and executive branches. This condition is the necessary pre-
requisite for the formation of a state governed by law. In order to create
a uniform legal policy and to provide for its stability, the article stipulates
that supreme courts sanction rulings on the constitutional character of
legal acts. The latter condition makes such rulings binding on all courts.
Subordinate courts, aware of the decision of the Supreme Court and the
State Arbitration on a concrete case, will have to act according to that
precedent; otherwise, lower court rulings will be reversed. The order
suggested by this article, as demonstrated by the United States experi-
ence, makes it unnecessary to set up some new constitutional body with a
new and special legal procedure.
Article 3. This article departs from the existing constitutional order
that an all-union act, as an act issued by a higher authority, shall prevail
over the republican act in case there is a discrepancy between the two. In
particular, this is stipulated by Articles 74 and 173 of the Constitution of
the USSR and by Article 75 of the Constitution of the ESSR. These pro-
visions are based on a clearly erroneous legal assumption that equates
the union republic, as a sovereign state, with an administrative unit of a
unitary state, such as a region or a district."' At the same time, the rela-
tionships between the Union and the Republic are not the administrative
relationships of subordination, but the union relations of the federation
and the sovereign state. Consequently, at work here is the principle lex
specialis derogat generali, which is especially evident when the republican
law is passed after the Union law. In this case the principle is also com-
plemented by the principle lex posterior derogat priori. Possible contradic-
tions are not the result of an essentially contradictory character of the
law, but an expression of a special opinion or original understanding of
the union republic.
Departing from practical considerations, it is not expedient to con-
duct a retroactive procedure for all the acting all-union acts-the costs
involved in the process would be exorbitant. Besides, most of these acts
have been passed in conformity with the procedure and are, as a result,
legally valid. The amendment does not reject the validity of legal proce-
dures employed in the Republic, but provides the Republic with addi-
tional guarantees in this sphere.
Bearing in mind the necessity of legislative and procedural brevity,
the present article recognizes the procedure stipulated in Article 2 of the
Addenda. However, in contrast to Article 2, the right to initiate refusal
of registration can be vested both in the Supreme Soviet of the ESSR and
II See KONST. SSSR art. 76; KONST. ESSR art. 68.
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its Presidium, often after a suggestion from the Supreme Court or State
Arbitration of the ESSR.
I have already mentioned that Professor John Attanasio and David
Good told me that this article ("supremacy clause") was very radical and
could change the entire pattern of the Soviet federative system. I shared
their apprehensions and conveyed the arguments of Professor Attanasio
to the meeting of the heads of all Estonian movements and voiced my
own doubts about the necessity of preserving this article in the project.
However, paradoxically is that it was this article that became the law of
Estonia on November 16, 1988, while other, more moderate ideas, were
never realized.
Article 4. This article gives real substance to internationally recog-
nized human rights for the first time in Soviet practice. In the context of
the Addenda, this means that any citizen has the right to appeal to the
court of law, basing the complaint directly on international pacts.
The article restores the principle fixed in Estonia's constitutions of
1920 and 1938 (Article 4).
Article 5. First, this article fixes-for the first time in Soviet history-
the democratic principle of division of power into legislative, executive
and legal branches (Articles 2 and 3 of the Addenda). The supremacy of
the legal branch turns it into a guarantor of stable law and order.
Second, the interpretation of the concept of sovereignty is necessary
for distancing it from the concepts of "divisible and partial sover-
eignty." 12 In order to restore the federalist principles derived from
Rousseau's Social Accord,13 the article stipulates in principle the possi-
bility (so far unaffirmed by the corresponding procedure) of the union
republic's renouncing some of its rights to union subordination. This
amendment once again confirms the border of competence between the
federation and the union republic specified in the constitutions of the
USSR and the ESSR. An analysis of these texts (Articles 73 of the Con-
stitutions of the USSR and the ESSR) demonstrates that this border does
not need any radical revision at present.
Any changes to these articles would be premature, all the more be-
cause so far we lack legal practice in their interpretation, and we just do
not know what these articles mean. The fact is that the federal authori-
ties act, as a rule, in defiance of the interests of the union republics. This
fact, however, does not mean that Article 73 is invalid. As has already
been mentioned, this article and the constitution at large are not yet op-
erative. The actual meaning of Article 73 must surface after the Addenda
12 Three such concepts are most widespread in the Soviet literature:
(a) the theory of potential sovereignty: the union republic is sovereign only before joining the
Union and after seceding from it;
(b) the theory of competence: the union republic is sovereign within the limits of its compe-
tence. KONST. SSSR art. 73(12); and
(c) the theory of actual sovereignty (or the positivist theory): the union republic is sovereign
only within the limits of its actual political capabilities.
Certain objections exist as to each one of these theories, but these deserve to be discussed in
another paper.
13 J.-J. ROUSSEAU, On Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, in ROUSSEAU's POLITICAL WRIT-
INGS 84 (A. Ritter &J. Bondanella ed. 1988).
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are adopted, when corresponding cases appear on the basis of Article 2
of the Addenda and relevant interpretations are made.
Article 7. The present definition characterizes the territory of the Es-
tonian SSR as a subject of international law, thus affirming the republic's
state sovereignty.
This article can be, if necessary, a prerequisite to Estonia's joining
the northern European process of nuclear disarmament, for example, via
declaring the Estonian SSR a nuclear-free state.
Article 8. This article is necessary as an adequate clarification of the
meaning of paragraph 6 of Article 73 of the Constitution of the USSR
and as a means of neutralizing the stereotype connected with this para-
graph and rejecting, in substance, the principle of sovereignty in financial
and credit matters. On the one hand, the Republic's right to its own
monetary system is a matter of principle. 14 On the other hand, this right
has a practical meaning, too. The unbalanced removal of products
turned out in the Republic is achieved in two ways: (1) by compulsory
removal of products to the so-called all-union funds; and (2) by buyers
from poorer neighboring regions of Russia. The unbalanced character
of this removal stems from the fact that in exchange for real goods and
services the Republic receives money which has no value, i.e. outside the
confines of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, this money can buy much less
volume of more expensive and low-quality goods. Thus, the Republic's
monetary system could protect the market of the Republic, whose popu-
lation does not exceed 0.5% of the population of the Soviet Union,
against removal of its produce via the second way.
Articles 9 and 10 of the Addenda, which I will discuss below, provide
a method for blocking compulsory removal of products to the all-union
fund. In general, it is intended not to reduce the exchange of goods
inside the Soviet Union but to put it on a commodity basis. Federal ex-
propriation must be replaced by civic-legal, commercial relationships
based on agreements.
Article 9. This article expresses the economic and civic-legal essence
of the sovereignty of the union republic. It must be noted that this article
only restores the actual legal state of affairs, since there are no legal justi-
fications for the transfer of property from the Estonian SSR to the Soviet
Union. In this context, the direct state property covers state enterprises
alone. Cooperative, joint-stock, private and similar ventures are prop-
erty under the republican sovereignty. In this case, the transfer of enter-
prises under the all-union and union-republican subordination will be an
exception to the rule which will require the clearly expressed will of the
legislative power of the Republic. Recognizing the presence of the fed-
eral economic interest and taking into account the absence in the USSR
of territories with special federal status, the Estonian SSR pledges to of-
fer its territory to the union departments and their capital investments.
14 Federalists argued that no republican monetary system was feasible in a federation and that
history knows no precedent. This is wrong. A colonial province of Tsarist Russia, Finland had its
currency and custom service. Moreover, even today there are several monetary systems in the USSR:
"conventional" rubles, various coupons (for hard-currency shops), checks, etc.
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However, the Republic retains the right to decide this question
independently.
According to this article the property of the Armed Forces is the
inseparable property of the Union of SSR, and the Estonian SSR indi-
rectly and temporarily rejects its sovereign right to have its own army.
State property interests will be protected against military authorities by
terminating the use of land as stipulated in Article 3 of the Addenda.
Article 10. This article has the meaning of a presumption and formu-
lates the regime: everything produced in the Republic shall be the prop-
erty of the Republic if not specified otherwise.
Articles 10 and 11. These articles exclude the administrative practice
of uncontrolled removal of produce from the Republic on the basis of
arbitrary decisions by union authorities. Instead, the transfer of products
to all-union funds will be conducted on the following terms: (a) estab-
lishment of long-term quotas of deductions to the all-union fund; (b) the
consent of the proprietor of the product, i.e. the union republic, to con-
duct such deductions.
Here the Republic takes upon itself duties of a monetary character.
In other words, no authority will command the .Republic to transfer natu-
ral products-meat, power, steel, etc. The long-term quotas accepted by
the Republic will be of a binding character and any failure to observe
these quotas will incur sanctions similar to civic-legal and international
trade sanctions. The Republic can participate in the union budget in two
ways: (a) the federation determines the volume of federal expenditure
(maintenance of the Armed Forces and the government, needs of the
defense industry) and sets, with the consent of the Republic, the sum the
Republic must pay to the union budget; or (b) the federation determines,
with the consent of the Republic, the tax in the form of a percentage of
the Republic's national income.
The main feature of the article is that the Republic becomes free
from the necessity to spend its money on federal projects in which it is
not interested.
Article 12. The history of the USSR and the Estonian SSR knows
numerous instances when the state broke its political commitments. For
example, the lands given to the peasants for eternal possession were later
confiscated (in the 1920s in the USSR and in the 1940s in the Estonian
SSR), and peasants themselves were repressed. The same happened to
private owners, to whom Vladimir Lenin guaranteed the inviolability of
property during the so-called New Economic Policy (NEP). This article is
designed to reduce the natural and justified suspicion of potential entre-
preneurs (both Soviet and foreign ones) of the state by providing legal
guarantees of property for the first time in history.
Article 13. This article characterizes concrete guarantees of basic
civil rights and freedoms, honored by the Constitution of the ESSR. It
speaks of the freedom of each citizen to express any convictions and
opinions if they do not result in active and legally punishable actions
against the existing state and constitutional system. This behavior can be
recognized as free when it is directed at improvement of the system.
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However, in any case, only a court of law can pass the corresponding
ruling. This constitutional amendment renders invalid the anti-demo-
cratic clauses of the Soviet criminal legislation, including the operative
Estonian criminal legislation, which is used as a means of terror against
political opposition.
Article 14. As is known, no constitution in the Soviet Union contains
the principle of the absolute character of civil freedoms. Freedoms of
speech, demonstrations, etc., can be used only in the interests of the
state, the people, and the existing system.' 5 It seems that at present no
deviation from this principle is feasible. However, this article strips the
authorities of the monopoly to express "the interest of the people." Any
expression of the popular will can be made exclusively in the form of
public court proceedings, which decide that the exercise of the particular
civic freedom is against the principle or fundamental interests of the
government.
This article also renders invalid classified laws concerning the rights,
freedoms, and duties of citizens.
Article 16. Professor Attanasio drew my attention to the discussion
connected with the Bill of Rights.16 A similar article was a part of older
Estonian Constitutions.' 7
Article 18. This article introduces the concept of the official (state)
language for the first time in the constitutional practice of the Estonian
SSR.' s According to commonly recognized practice this means that (a)
the Estonian language shall be the language of business correspondence
used by state institutions in relations with each other; (b) the Estonian
language shall be the original language of the legal acts issued in the
Republic; (c) the state must provide a broad network of opportunities for
people of other nationalities to study the Estonian language; and (d) the
state shall have the right to compile a list of positions to be filled only if
the applicant is fluent in the Estonian language.
All these requirements do not, by any means, cover the internal af-
fairs of local and ethnic self-governments. Failure to learn the state lan-
guage can by no means be a basis of any limitation of civic rights and
freedoms, except the limitation of the right to work, as specified in sec-
tion (d) of this commentary.
Aspect (b) is juridically important, too. In the past the federal
Supreme Court of the USSR has actually usurped the right to interpret
the laws of the union republics. By declaring the Russian text of the laws
of the Estonian SSR to be translations from the Estonian original, the
amended constitution puts an end to this practice.
Article 19. The principle of cultural autonomy implies granting polit-
ical and cultural rights as well as bodies of self-government to ethnic mi-
norities which do not have sovereign territories within this state.
Communities recognized as ethnic minorities (in Estonia these must be
15 See KONST. SSSR arts. 47, 50, 51.
16 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
17 See KONST. ESSR art. 33 (1938); KoNST. ESSR art. 26 (1920).
18 Cf KONST. ESSR art. 5 (1938); KONST. ESSR art. 5 (1920).
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Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Finns, Germans, Poles, etc.) have the right to
receive the support of the state in organizing ethnic-linguistic elementary
education, to set up self-governed ethnic communities and cultural es-
tablishments, and to enjoy guaranteed political representation in parlia-
ment. Detailing this principle, including representation, must be carried
out during the reform of legislative power in the Estonian SSR at the
second stage of the constitutional reform.
Article 20. This amendment is a clarification of Article 33 of the Con-
stitution of the USSR and Article 31 of the Constitution of the Estonian
SSR. Both articles fix the primacy of Union Republic citizenship. A citi-
zen of the Union Republic is simultaneously a citizen of the Soviet Union
and not vise versa. In contrast to this provision, Article 121(10) of the
Constitution of the USSR vests the right to make decisions on citizenship
issues in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Thus, the
amendment removes this contradiction in favor of affirming the republi-
can sovereignty. The relatively homogeneous population of Estonia
(95% Estonian) in 1940 no longer exists. Today Estonians make up less
than 60% of the Republic's population and are in the minority in the
Republic's capital city of Tallinn. Introduction of Estonian citizenship
can, on the one hand, put an end to the mechanical assimilation of Es-
tonians and, on the other hand, abolish the antidemocratic system of in-
ternal passports in Estonia. Departing from the principle that a
democratic state is a means of protection and expression of interests of
all citizens, persons who do not have this citizenship are stripped of pas-
sive and active franchise as regards state bodies of power (but not the
local bodies of self-government!), and of the right to participate in refer-
enda. This serves as a guarantee against excessive influence in the elec-
torate by a transient part of the population who regard the Estonian SSR
as a temporary place of residence.
Lack of Estonian citizenship can relieve a person of some specific
duties with respect to the ESSR-for instance, service in national armed
forces, payment of some taxes, etc.-but also can lead to the absence of
some rights that concern a person's relationships with the state, such as
franchise and the right to occupy certain positions. At this, one should
pay attention to the right to freely abrogate the Estonian citizenship rec-
ognized by the Republic in Article 15(b) of the Addenda.
Article 21. Assuming that the constitution, which requires sufficient
time to be worked out, would be sound and applicable for a long period
in history, the article stipulates a new, more complicated and more dem-
ocratic procedure for its adoption which eliminates the possibility of its
arbitrary change by the Supreme Soviet. Historic practice demonstrates
that the very presence of the Supreme Soviet, which often votes unani-
mously, is not a guarantee of stability and democratic character of the
law.
V. The Speedy Evolution of Events
As has already been mentioned, the "Gryazin project" was intended
for a lengthy discussion. However, on October 22, 1988, the text of the
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amendments to the Constitution of the USSR was published. 19 As the
most cursory analysis can show, it deprived the union republics even of
that formal sovereignty they had enjoyed before. 20 Since the analysis of
this document is not the subject matter of the present Paper, I will con-
fine myself to only two examples.
Article 119(13) granted central authorities the right to arbitrarily de-
prive republican bodies of power by introducing martial law or "special
forms of government." It followed from this article that the federal au-
thorities acquired the right arbitrarily to remove republican govern-
ments, for instance, when the latter raise the question of seceding from
the Union, which is an inseparable right of the union republic. However,
so far, expression of this right has been regarded as a criminal offense.
Article 113(7) of the draft concentrated new prerogatives, such as
legislative regulation of property relationships, payment, and price for-
mation, in the hands of central authorities. The list of new federal pre-
rogatives was left open.
Such examples are numerous. The Estonian SSR was, in effect, de-
prived of the opportunity to block the bill parliamentarily. Even had all
the deputies from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania voted unanimously
against the bill, it would have been passed by a majority vote anyway.
There was one way out left-conscientious creation of a constitutional
conflict between the Constitutions of the USSR and the ESSR, in which
the latter could win a chance to preserve its sovereignty, if only formally.
Because the adoption of the amendments to the Constitution of the
USSR was scheduled for the end of November, 1988, the deadline for
Estonia's countermeasures was November 20, 1988-the reason being
that a law passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR comes into
force ten days after it is published in the official newspapers. On the
request of the people and deputies, the session of the Supreme Soviet of
the Estonian SSR was convened on November 16.
During the campaign for the session, public awareness started to
favor the adoption of "the supremacy clause," which was the simplest
and most apparent means of protecting the republic's sovereignty. The
clause was dubbed "the Laak-Preimann amendment" after the names of
the deputies who officially presented the article. This amendment made
it possible to refuse honoring, in Estonia, the amendments to the Soviet
Union's Constitution which encroached on the state sovereignty of Esto-
nia. Characteristically, the press had almost no objections to the Laak-
Preimann amendment itself, but debated its two versions, the meaning of
which boils down to the following:
(a) all federal laws acting in the Estonian SSR are valid if they are
not declared as contradicting the Constitution of the Estonian SSR;
(b) no federal law is valid in the Estonian SSR until it is approved by
the Estonian SSR.
19 For the text of the draft amendments, see Draft Law on Constitutional Amendements [sic], British
Broadcasting Corp., October 24, 1988 (NEXIS library, Currnt file).
20 Recall that Article 76 of the Constitution of the USSR and Article 68 of the Estonian Constitu-
tion define the Union Republic as "a sovereign Soviet socialist state."
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As can be easily seen, the difference here is in the different presump-
tions, of which variant (b) is more radical. Variant (b) has no significant
difference from Article 3 of the Addenda, and it was adopted as the law.
VI. The November 16, 1988 Session
On November 16, 1988, the extraordinary session of the Supreme
Soviet of the Estonian SSR was held in Tallinn. The session received
extensive coverage in the world press. The session adopted a number of
documents which obviously are too lengthy to be published here in full;
however, some aspects connected with the development of Estonia's con-
stitutional reform should be noted. To have a better idea of the charac-
ter and tendencies of this process, let us compare these aspects with
articles of the Addenda. 2 1
A. The Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist
Republic on the Sovereignty of the Estonian SSR
Noting that a number of negative phenomena in the Republic (eco-
nomic, ecological, and demographic crises) derive from the interference
of the federal authorities into the affairs of the Republic, it was declared
that Estonia's sovereignty had to be restored. In this connection the
Declaration includes the following definition: "The sovereignty of the
Estonian SSR implies that the republic's supreme bodies of power, ad-
ministration and justice shall have the supreme power all over the terri-
tory of Estonia. The sovereignty of the Estonian SSR is integral and
indivisible." 22 Thus, Article 5 of the Addenda proved to be not the jurid-
ical norm, but an expression of the official will of the Republic's supreme
legislative body. The Declaration also stipulated "the supremacy of the
laws of the Estonian SSR in the territory of the Estonian SSR" 23 and
fixed the procedure under which the amendments to the Constitution of
the USSR were to come into force in Estonia only after they have been
approved by Estonia. In the definition of sovereignty the principle of
division of power was fixed for the first time in the Soviet practice. Natu-
rally, this idea itself seems trivial today, but in the Declaration it served as
the opposition to the concept according to which democratization of so-
ciety had to be achieved through strengthening the power of the repre-
sentative legislative body.24
B. The Law of the Estonian SSR on Introducing Changes and Amendments to
the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Estonian SSR
The following amendments were introduced:
21 I would like to suggest that the reader have the text of the Constitution of the USSR by his
side when reading the following.
22 The text of the Declaration has been translated and reprinted in Estonia Claims Right to Veto
USSR Laws, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, December 21, 1988 (NEXIS library, Currnt file).
23 Id
24 This was the stand which B. Lazarev attempted to justify in the Kommunist (no. 16, 1988). And
it was this idea that Thomas Jefferson opposed in his time.
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(1) The preamble was complemented with a clause to the effect
that the legal system of the Republic incorporated all pacts on human
rights ratified by the Soviet Union, in particular the Pact on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and the Pact on Civil and Political Rights. 25
(2) The article of the Constitution of the Estonian SSR corre-
sponding to Article 4 of the Constitution of the USSR was comple-
mented with the following text: "citizens and juridical persons in the
Estonian SSR enjoy legal protection of their constitutional rights."
26
(3) The article of the Constitution of the Estonian SSR corre-
sponding to Article 10 of the Constitution of the USSR was changed.
The first three paragraphs were rewritten as:
The foundation of the economic system of the Estonian SSR is
socialist ownership of the means of production in the form of state,
cooperative property and property of public organizations and public
movements.
The economic system of the Estonian SSR also includes personal,
private and mixed property.
The state protects all forms of property and provides conditions
for its growth.
27
The fourth paragraph of the article was left intact.
(4) The article of the Constitution of the Estonian SSR corre-
sponding to Article 1 1 of the Constitution of the USSR was changed.
The first paragraph was left intact, while the second paragraph was re-
written as:
The land, its minerals, atmospheric air, internal and territorial waters,
shelf, forests and other natural resources are the exclusive property of
the Estonian SSR. The Estonian SSR owns the basic means of produc-
tion in industry, construction, and agriculture; means of transport and
communication; the banks; the property of state-run trade organiza-
tions and public utilities, and other state-run undertakings; most ur-
ban housing; and other property necessary for purposes of the
Estonian SSR.
28
(5) Article 74 of the Constitution of the Estonian SSR, correspond-
ing to Article 74 of the Constitution of the USSR, which formerly read
"the laws of the USSR shall have the same force in the Estonian SSR,"
was rewritten as:
Laws and other legal acts of the USSR shall come into force in the
Estonian SSR after they have been registered in line with the proce-
dure established by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Esto-
nian SSR.
25 Compare with Article 4 of the Addenda.
26 Compare with Articles 2, 14, and 15(d) of the Addenda.
27 Compare with Article 12 of the Addenda. Legal protection of property, suggested by the
draft, is achieved by aligning this amendment with the preceding one, which declares legal protec-
tion ofjuridical persons. The notion of private property was introduced for the first time.
28 Compare with Articles 7, 9, and 10 of the Addenda. In this the lawmakers conscientiously
departed from Article 7 of the draft which defines the territory of Estonia. This definition was re-
placed by the one including the total of resources belonging to Estonia. This variant is more up to
the point: today the main problem is not to protect the territory of Estonia but its natural resources
from the federal authorities.
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The Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR has the right to suspend
or limit the application of legislative or other acts of the USSR if such
acts violate the sovereignty of the Estonian SSR or regulate the ques-
tions which, according to the Constitution of the Estonian SSR, per-
tain to the prerogative of said Estonian SSR or disregard the specificity
of the republic.
2 9
In addition, amendments were introduced to eleven more articles of
the Constitution of the ESSR, which in effect meant that the Popular
Front was constitutionally given equal rights with earlier public organiza-
tions. This effect was achieved by adding the words "and public move-
ments" to the words "public organizations."
3 0
In other words, the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR did not
consider or adopt most of those articles of the Addenda which can be
called the amendments to the Bill of Rights. In fact, the situation did not
change. By recognizing the international pact on human rights as part of
the legal system of Estonia, the Bill of Rights of Estonia became formally
identical with the Bill of Rights recognized by the world community.
One can say that this recognition renders juridically meaningless the cor-
responding articles of the Addenda: Articles 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17.31
Thus, nine out of the suggested twenty-one amendments became
the law of the Estonian SSR one way or another. By the way, on Decem-
ber 5, 1988, at its next sitting, the Supreme Soviet of the ESSR adopted
the constitutional amendment that makes Estonian the state language of
the republic.
Unfortunately, during the discussion and adoption of these amend-
ments, the lawmakers omitted the very principle of their technical form
as additional clauses of the main text of the constitution. However, there
was no time for discussion, and any technical innovations would only
complicate legislative and constitutional problems, complex as they are.
Thus, a more remote, long-term objective-correction of the
"supremacy clause"-became (quite unexpectedly) an acting law of Esto-
nia, moreover, the nucleus of the constitutional amendments. However,
I repeat, the immediate objectives of the constitutional reform, as I was
often told by my esteemed American colleagues, could have been
achieved also by the aggregate of other norms contained in the Gryazin
project.
If we consider the change of the supremacy clause, i.e. the Laak-
Preimann amendment, as the nucleus of the implemented part of the
constitutional reform, then in its turn the procedure of registering all-
union laws by the Republic is its internal legal nucleus. The main princi-
29 Compare with Article 3 of the Addenda.
30 Compare with Article 6 of the Addenda.
31 Moreover, in retrospect, one can say that the inclusion of Articles 13-17 in the Addenda was,
on my part, a theoretical mistake that could bring about negative juridical results. Since the interna-
tionally recognized rights are broader than those specified by Articles 13-17 of the Addenda, their
doubling in the Constitution could be interpreted as the absence of force of international pacts as
long as their provisions are not specified in the Constitution of the Estonian SSR. This would mean
"a reduction" in the volume of rights guaranteed by the said pacts. This mistake was slightly re-
paired, however, by Article 16 of the Addenda, but in this case this mistake does not attest to the
juridical correctness of the document either.
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pie of this procedure and the text of the draft law to this effect was
worked out on the day after the session (November 17, 1988) and ap-
proved at a theoretical seminar of lawyer-members of popular move-
ments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
VII. Procedure for Registering Federal Laws in the Republic
Preliminarily, however, I would like to remind the readers of the re-
gime for constitutional checking of normative acts, suggested by the
Addenda:3
2
(a) a normative act of the federation or the Republic shall not be
applied by a court of law if the court of law declares the act to be contra-
dictory to the Constitution of the Estonian SSR; formally the act shall
remain in force but shall not enjoy legal protection;
(b) all-union normative acts shall come into force in Estonia only
after they have been registered by the legislative body of the Republic;
thus, registration is a preliminary (with respect to the court of law) stage
of the probation of the constitutional character of the all-union law.
In other words, if the registration procedure realizes the principle of
the Union Republic's sovereignty within the USSR, then the court con-
trol is the realization of the principle of division of power within the Re-
public itself.
An American colleague might need one more clarification. So far, I
have used freely the terms "law" and "normative act" as if they were
synonyms. Now I must explain the difference between the two. Laws are
acts of the legislative power-both in the USSR and the union republics;
they are acts of the Supreme Soviet. Their number is comparatively
small; they are usually passed openly and thus constitute no special prob-
lem. The essence of the tragedy of the Soviet economic and legal sys-
tems is found not in laws, but in the right of ministries and committees
attached to the Council of Ministers to issue, in the administrative order,
acts which in effect have the same force as the laws, i.e. they are binding
on many physical and juridical persons. Such administrative normative
acts of the federal authorities have set arbitrary prices, strictly limited
financial and accounting activities, removed the republic's products to
all-union funds, established the limits of wages and salaries, and-this
fact is indeed a paradox-determined the recipes for different brands of
bread and the price of tickets to cinemas. 33 The number of such acts is
infinite, and it would be absurd to speak of any constant monitoring of
the constitutional character of these acts-this is simply physically
unfeasible.
These preliminary notes will, hopefully, help in understanding the
juridical meaning of the following text of the draft law on registration
and the process by which all-union laws and other normative acts become
effective in the Estonian SSR. Here is the text:
32 See Articles 2 and 3.
33 This situation remained until November, 1988.
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(1) Registration of laws and normative acts is the procedure for
probation of such acts from the point of view of their compliance with
the Constitution of the Estonian SSR.
(2) All-union laws shall come into force in the Estonian SSR af-
ter they are registered by the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR. In
the period between the sessions of the Supreme Soviet, these laws are
registered preliminarily by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
Estonian SSR, after which they come into force. The decision on the
preliminary registration shall be approved at the next session of the
Supreme Soviet of the Republic. Refusal of registration shall suspend
the application of the law.
(3) All-union normative acts shall become valid and registered in
the Republic from the moment they are issued by the originating
body. These acts are in force in the Estonian SSR provided they are
not declared contradictory to the Constitution of the Estonian SSR in
a court of law.
The court procedure for registration of such acts does not rule
out the right of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR and its Presid-
ium to probe their constitutional character. The procedure of initiat-
ing the relative proceedings is similar to the legislative process.
This is only the general idea. As can be seen from the text, proce-
dural issues are not yet elaborated and processual terms not yet defined,
etc. However, the events that followed propelled further elaboration of
this important procedure, necessary for the realization of the Laak-
Preimann amendment, to the background.
VIII. The Federation's Reaction
On November 26, 1988, ten days after the extraordinary session of
the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR, came the federal response to
the constitutional changes implemented by Estonia. The Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a decree which declared a
number of amendments to the Constitution of the Estonian SSR invalid.
Before considering some of the arguments of this decree, let's consider
one extremely important question: is this decree itself juridically valid; does
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR have the right to issue
such decrees?
Actually, according to Article 121(4) of the Constitution of the
USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "ensure[s] ob-
servance of the Constitution of the USSR and conformity of the Consti-
tutions and laws of the Union of Republics to the Constitution and laws
of the USSR." It does not follow from this, however, that the federal
lawmaker has the right to cancel or declare invalid supreme legislative
acts of the Republic, expressing the juridically sovereign will of its peo-
ple. Moreover, the law regulating the procedural issues of the USSR
Supreme Soviet activities, directly prescribes what should be done in
such cases. Article 64 of the Regulation of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR says that if there is a discrepancy between the republican and all-
union laws, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR has only
the right to suggest that the Republic bring its legislation into conformity
with the all-union legislation. There are no other powers. There is only
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one possible conclusion: the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR is invalid itself, and the words about the cancellation
of the amendments to the Constitution of the ESSR have emotional,
rather than juridical force.
Nonetheless, although the said decree has no legal force whatsoever,
it is interesting as a document, expressing the federalist concept of the
state in the form it had at the end of November, 1988.
The main and most unexpected action was that on having "can-
celled" 34 two out of the five parts of the Declaration on Sovereignty, the
federal lawmaker left intact that part of the Declaration that gives the
absolute definition of sovereignty. By this token, the federal lawmaker
recognized in words that the supreme power in the republic belongs to the
republic itself. As for the changes in the Constitution of the Estonian SSR,
the federal lawmaker "cancelled" the amendments we spoke about in the
first part of this paper, marked there under Nos. 2-5. 35 The Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "affirmed the validity" of recognizing
international pacts on human rights as a part of the Estonian legislation
(although it "cancelled" legal protection of them) and of constitutionally
legalizing public movements.
As for the ideological and conceptual conflict of the federalist and
democratic "parties" in the constitutional reform, one must note three
crucial aspects of the critical content of this decree.
First, as we remember, the amendment to the Constitution of the
Estonian SSR, while providing guarantees of inviolability of property,
stipulated the existence of private property along with the traditional
forms of property. This amendment was "cancelled" because the Con-
stitution of the USSR does not contain this form of property. It follows
that the federal lawmaker adheres to the presumption: everything that is
not delegated by the federal Constitution to the competence of the re-
public is the competence of the federation. 36 Thus, it is presumed that
the republic has no right of its own besides those declared by the federal
Constitution. This presumption affirmed the stand expressed in Article
73 of the Constitution of the USSR, which defines the questions of the
federal competence. The list of them concludes with the words "and set-
tlement of other matters of all-union importance."37 In other words, the
federal competence here must be interpreted more broadly, while the
republic still doesn't have the rights absolutely guaranteed to it.
Second, the article on the property of the Estonian SSR was "can-
celled," too. It follows from this that today the federal authorities are
still unprepared for a juridical analysis of both the 1940 events in the
Baltic Region and the legal basis of Estonia's joining the USSR. The
34 When commenting on the November 26 decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme So-
viet, the word "cancel" must be in quotation marks because, as I have demonstrated, this document
has no juridical power whatsoever.
35 See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
36 This provision is directly opposed to the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.




problem is that so far there are no juridical grounds to recognize the
state property of Estonia as federal property. To wit: if (a) Estonia was
occupied by the USSR in 1940, then the basis of the union property is the
occupation power, which cannot be recognized as the basis of legitimate
property; if (b) Estonia's joining the Soviet Union is recognized to have
been voluntary, then again there is no act on alienation of the property of
Estonia-to say nothing of natural resources: land, water, minerals, etc.
Such documents or political declarations just do not exist. In such an
important business there can be no automatic alienation of property.3 8 It
must be specially stressed that the legal document of 1922 that is the
basis of the formation of the USSR was never signed by Estonia.
Third, the federal authorities expressed their willingness to protect
the supremacy clause in their favor by "cancelling" the corresponding
amendment to the Constitution of the Estonian SSR. However, on ex-
pressing this willingness, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR went into conflict with its own Decree, which recognizes the
supremacy of the republican power on the territory of the republic.
In general, it can be said that when we speak about constitutional
differences in the Soviet Union we mean the intrinsic contradictions of
the federal Constitution rather than the differences between the constitu-
tional policies of the federal and republican authorities. On the one
hand, there are such provisions as the sovereignty of the Union Repub-
lic3 9 and affirmation of its absolute character in the November 26, 1988
Decree, the protection of the Republic's territory against the federal au-
thorities,40 the Republic's right to enter into relations with other states,4 1
and, at last, the right to secede from the Soviet Union.42 On the other
hand, there are the recognition of the supremacy of federal laws over
republican ones,43 the subordination of the republican procurator to the
federal one,44 and obvious interference of the federal authorities in the
internal affairs of the Republic. 45 The Estonian SSR, by developing and
using one set of articles opposed by the other, did not create any new
differences, but only brought the Constitution of the USSR, with its deep
contradictions, out of its state of internally contradicting balance.
IX. Constitutional Conflict
Thus, the constitutional conflict took shape by the end of 1988. On
the one hand, the amendments introduced to the Constitution of the Es-
tonian SSR and based on a number of articles of the Constitution of the
USSR entered in opposition to other articles of the federal Constitution.
On the other hand, the federal authorities expressed their negative atti-
tude to these amendments, but could not cancel them and never at-
38 By the way--even Manhattan Island was bought from the Indians.
39 KONST. SSSR art. 81.
40 KONST. SSSR art. 78.
41 KONST. SSSR art. 80.
42 KoNsr. SSSR art. 72.
43 KONST. SSSR art. 74.
44 KONST. SSSR art. 166.
45 KONST. SSSR arts. 145-150.
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tempted to do so. The Estonian SSR did not renounce its amendments
either.46 The situation should be interpreted as follows: the Union
thinks that the amendments to the Constitution of the Estonian SSR are
not operative. On its part Estonia adheres to the opposing stand,
although without advertising it. The real state of affairs must be revealed
by the courts, which both sides have so far been trying to avoid.
What are the prospects for resolution of this conflict? There are no
prospects at all until the principle of supremacy of law over political
power is restored. If the constitution is not binding on the authorities,
then it does not matter what the constitution declares nor in which form
it declares it. However, since the creation of the state governed by law
was declared by the Soviet Union as the program objective, the solution
of this conflict will soon become a pressing necessity. A lawyer who has
not lost the sense of reality cannot but understand that no compromise
in the field of the supremacy clause is possible, and, consequently, the
only prospect is a more reasonable, democratic and legitimate distribu-
tion of competence between the federal and republican authorities.
However, as a proponent of the ideas of Thomas Jefferson, and as one
who bears in mind his thirty-seventh letter to The Federalist, I do not
expect much from the new distribution of competence: in practice it will
never be absolutely accurate.
That is why the real way out of the constitutional conflict between
the Estonian SSR and the Soviet Union, a conflict which is likely to
spread to other union republics as democratization develops in the
USSR, is the establishment of a court, independent from the federal and
republican authorities, which could look into and resolve similar con-
flicts. 4 7 This court would be able to protect not only the just interest of
the federation and its members, but also the supreme juridical value and
the guarantor of existence of a democratic society-its constitution.
46 The December 5, 1988 session of the Supreme Soviet affirmed the decisions taken on Novem-
ber 16.
47 The Committee for Constitution Supervision, which is being created by the federal lawmaker,
cannot solve this problem. First, it will be an organ of one of the conflicting sides-the federation,
Second, in accordance with the amended Constitution of the USSR it will have no prerogatives and
functions of a court of law. However, the very fact of creation of such a body is in itself the first step
towards a more serious protection of Soviet constitutionalism.
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